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I: Introduction
 Humanity stands on the brink of the abyss in our moral world.  
At times, we are aware of the vastness that we stand next to, gazing over 
our shoulder.  Other times, our back is completely turned away, in naïve-
té.  The moment of truth comes, however, when we turn fully toward the 
brink.  Do we choose to back away, respecting the ledge and its danger?  
Or do we loose ourselves in the abyss and fall in?  In his awesome under-
taking of a look at the acts of inhumanity that darkened the Twentieth 
Century, Jonathan Glover, examines situations where humanity is able to 
back away, or falls hopeless into the chasm.  Humanity argues that there 
is a terrible black thread of “psychological weakness” (Glover, 43) that 
runs between the inordinate evils that occurred, tying them together as 
products of human failing.  While the latter of this argument is certainly 
agreed with, there are question as to whether or not it is truly a psycho-
logical weakness or something more.  Glover’s moral resources are at 
best, only necessary moral requirements to describe an average moral 
reaction to atrocity.  One could honor the moral resources, be considered 
a moral entity, and nevertheless still be a bystander.  Those who have 
acted in “exemplary” ways do much more than the average.  I will argue 
that Glover’s resources are thus inadequate when taken alone, both as a 
description of those heroic cases, and as a prescription for how to ethi-
cally face atrocity.
II: On the Brink of the Abyss
 To begin with, it is important to understand what Glover’s con-
ception of the moral resources.  In responding directly to “Nietzsche’s 
Challenge,” Glover posits the existence of the moral resources.  Moral 
resources are human needs and psychological tendencies that either play 
to our moral identity, or to our “human responses” (Glover, 22).  There 
are two types of human responses; respect and sympathy.  Glover argues 
that respect and sympathy work both to describe the moral inclinations 
humans feel, and how they apply as preventative and staunching mea-
sures against immoral behavior.  It is more difficult to commit an atrocity 
against others if they have dignity and respect (Glover, 23-24).  Sympathy 
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unites our experiences for what it is to suffer, with other humans, thus 
acting as a powerful emotional control mechanism (Glover, 24).  
Moral identity, Glover explains, is a series of either conscious or sub-
conscious commitments that reflect a certain character that any given 
human may want to become (Glover, 26).  These two divisions combine 
to become a strong deterrent to “ruthless selfishness” because of a greatly 
raised “psychological cost” (Glover, 27).  Our human concern for the kind 
of person we may be perceived to be conflicts with a harmful self-interest, 
or damages what respect of ourselves or others, and what sympathy we 
feel with those who may be damaged by our self-interest.
Glover admits that these measures can be eroded and repaired under 
different circumstances; “People slide by degrees into doing things they 
would not do if given a clear choices at the beginning” (Glover, 35).  This 
allows for slow degradation of respect and sympathy, and this slide 
happens in such a way as to not initially conflict with a moral identity. 
Moreover, a person committing an immoral act can be jarred back into 
appropriate action, as the example of a policeman being prevented by 
beating a woman, by handing her the shoe she lost as he chased her 
(Glover, 37-38).
 Be that as it may, Glover’s moral resources on their own are 
simply not enough to define the characteristics of a person who acted 
in an exemplary manner during an atrocity.  In the recent Rwandan 
genocide, where 800,000 people lost their lives in a hundred days, an 
entire nation turned neighbor against neighbor with thousands of active 
participants in the killings all across the country.  Thousands more sat by 
and watched the killings occur in their own backyards.  Worse still, the 
brutal slaughter continued on in the full glare of the world’s eyes, and na-
tions shook their heads and did nothing.  To keep from having to become 
involved, “the United States along with most other governments, simply 
avoided using the word” (Ghosts of Rwanda, 2004).  
 Yet, following Glover’s moral resources, these parties can pro-
claim to be moral entities, and remain guiltless bystanders.  A civilian 
can stand by, feel respect for those who are being butchered, feel physi-
cal pain in sympathy, know that the killing is wrong and not want to be 
a party to it, and still do nothing.  This bystander may even have a valid 
excuse—as described by David Jones in his work on the characters of the 
participants, victims and bystanders in the Holocaust—being “prevented 
from acting by a lack of opportunity” (Jones, 215).  A valid excuse allows 
the bystander to cognitively recognize that he would, under appropriate 
circumstances, normally not be a bystander—or act to help a person in 
need.  However, due to prevailing circumstances, some “lack” of oppor-
tunity, the bystander in question is prevented from acting, out of fear for 
life and limb, or lack of resources to help.  This bystander can maintain 
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all his moral resources intact; he may feel awful, or even guilty by not 
intervening, but the resources have not faltered.
 This is inadequate to describe those few who acted exemplary.  
One example is of Philippe Gaillard, a Red Cross doctor in the capital of 
Rwanda during the genocide.  He chose to make the news of the genocide 
public, despite the possibility of serious retribution and harm (Ghosts 
of Rwanda, 2004).  The consideration of the threat of serious harm is a 
valid excuse for not helping (Jones 215), yet Gaillard finds himself com-
pelled to help—beyond his foundation of moral resources:  
In such circumstances, if you don’t at least speak out clearly; you are 
participating to, to the genocide, I mean, if you just shut up when you 
see what you see.  And morally, ethically, you cannot shut up.  It’s your 
responsibility to talk.  To speak out.  (Ghosts of Rwanda, 2004, emphasis 
mine)
 Gaillard’s self-description about how it feels to be merely a 
bystander and not react gets at the core issues to Glover’s resources as a 
descriptive explanation of human moral action.  Gaillard feels the moral 
resources; he works to save lives, not take them.  However, it is not just 
sympathy or respect, it is a responsibility to human life.  
Jones refers to these actors as “supererogatory;” going “above and 
beyond” average behavior, often disregarding danger to oneself (Jones, 
222).  Gaillard is certainly an example of this; he raised awareness of the 
horrors occurring around him, stayed when many others had left, and 
once even directly confronting the then extremist leader to stop the kill-
ings (Ghosts of Rwanda, 2004).  Even though he was rebuffed, Gaillard is 
still to be commended; he at least tried.
 Acting is an important part of becoming more than a bystander 
in an atrocity.  And the moral resources fail to prescribe how to behave 
when faced with a morally trying situation.  One particularly challeng-
ing example is that of the case of My Lai, when members of the U.S. 
army Charlie company murdered nearly 500 unarmed old men, women, 
and children, in an extended period of four hours.  The company had 
sustained four killed and thirty-eight wounded before the attack, and 
was ordered to show aggression when storming the village, which was 
believed to hold a Viet Cong stronghold.  This is a grueling case because 
U.S. military service members are supposed to be trained to do exactly 
the opposite of the case that occurred during the event.  If soldiers are 
trained to spare innocents, and were backed up by their moral resources, 
how could have this atrocity occurred?
 The answer lies firmly in the case that the moral resources simply 
are inadequate to prescribe action.  Glover exclaims the case of the 120 
soldiers moral failing is due to the very fact they received orders to be 
aggressive, and that they experienced strong peer pressure to conform 
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(Glover, 59).  Nevertheless, there are examples of their peers who did 
not participate in the slaughter (Glover, 59).  One such example is that 
of Hugh Thompson, a reconnaissance helicopter pilot, who, when seeing 
the massacre the American soldiers were propagating, landed his chop-
per in between a fleeing group of Vietnamese and a band of advancing 
soldiers.  He ordered his gunner to open fire on the advancing troops if 
they attempted to shoot at the civilians.
 Thompson not only risked his own life, but also defied pres-
sures of conformity, and the commands of a superior officer to do the 
right thing.  His moral resources alone did not prevent the further 
killings of innocents, but the action he took.  Jones refers to those who 
feel obligated to help, to pursue the correct course of action, because 
of a strong sense of moral duty.  Acting against, or not acting in these 
cases is impossible; “their sense of integrity will not allow it” (Jones, 
223).  Hugh Thompson’s actions are seen as the highest moral regard.  
In William Eckhardt’s discussion of the massacre, the resolution about 
a prescribed course of action in the face of atrocity is clear: “ACT LIKE 
HUGH THOMPSON” (Eckhardt).  It is not enough to simply recognize 
and acknowledge atrocity, but regardless of the possible consequences to 
life and limb, take action against atrocity; it is the best moral course of 
action.
III:  The Fog
 Of course, situations where a genocide is occurring, or armed 
men are gunning down innocent civilians are not black and white.  It 
could probably be argued, and I feel rightly so, that these atrocities oc-
cur simply because they are not clear-cut.  But this is an argument for a 
different paper.  However, this does place the moral resources into an 
interesting predicament.  Glover argues that individually, the parts of his 
moral resources: moral identity and moral human responses of respect 
and sympathy, cannot hold back the unfortunate and innate pull of the 
abyss on humanity (Glover, 403-404); “to function as a moral restraint 
against atrocity, the sense of moral identity most of all needs to be rooted 
in the human responses” (Glover 404).
 It could be argued that my thesis, in the same way as Glover’s, 
falls short.  The moral resources are at best only a starting place.  Having 
them does not prevent genocide or massacre.  Having them does not stop 
a moral soldier from shooting a child. And if this is true, then how can 
the moral resources prevent a moral being from simply standing by and 
doing nothing?
 The difference is in a responsibility to action.  As Philippe Gail-
lard began to treat victims, the aid workers would occasionally have to 
leave the country because the gross inhumanity made them “crazy; but, 
then you find other people, who [are] able to take risks, and to do the 
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very little things you can do.  Which are always miracles.  Do miracles.  
In such contexts it’s the only way to do something I guess” (Ghosts of 
Rwanda, 2004).  To be effective as descriptions for the exemplary actors, 
to be prescriptive for their behavior, the moral resources need another 
component.  They fail as the Red Cross failed during the Holocaust, as 
the soldiers’ training failed during My Lai, as the world failed as the kill-
ing continued for days and weeks and months in Rwanda.
IV: Conclusion
 Alone, Glover’s moral resources are simply inadequate to de-
scribe how those who act exemplary in the face of atrocities are able, and 
is inadequate to prescribe to others how to act in the face of an atroc-
ity.  The moral resources are, at best, only a necessary component of a 
moral being.  In Rwanda, despite the overwhelming events, there were 
people, able to see the abyss before them, and step away.  They helped 
save people, at risk of life and limb.  They continued to persevere even as 
the tide of bodies and maimed poured over them.  They felt strongly the 
moral resources, but they also felt a responsibility to speak out.  In My 
Lai, a single pilot placed himself between advancing American soldiers 
and the innocent Vietnamese civilians they were going to kill.  Hugh 
Thompson would not have acted had he lacked the moral resources, but 
he would not have acted if he had not felt a duty, an obligation to stop the 
killing.  He watched as the men around him succumbed to the abyss that 
haunts humanity.
 Inside each of us, there is a capacity for evil—for death and de-
struction.  For wanton lust of violence and cruelty.  This is countered by 
the knowledge we have, and our moral obligation to the other members 
of humanity.  This is not just caring for them, or respecting them, even 
if we do not like them.  This is a genuine concern for the well being of 
others.  This is the tether that prevents most from falling into the abyss at 
our backs.
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